Ronald Dworkin, in his posthumous book, A New Philosophy for International Law, explores the underlying rationale of international law from a moral standpoint. Rather than an agnostic approach to international law, he rejects this perspective and suggests a more robust and persuasive basis for international law. He proposes three core principles: legitimacy, salience, and mitigation. As the title suggests, each of these principles has a dual purpose. In addition to identifying moral and political purposes, each of these theories provides an alternative framework for understanding the role of the normative system.
The principles underlying Dworkin’s approach to international law include non-metaphysical conceptions of moral facts, optimistic views of moral judgments, and an anti-naturalistic account of moral propositions. This theory advocates an interpretive framework based on the common good and human rights. This view has several implications. In particular, it argues that a government should be legitimate only if it respects the rights of its citizens.
Dworkin’s work is based on three fundamental assumptions. His view of moral facts is not metaphysical. His views are optimistic and he emphasizes moral judgments. His stance on the relationship between moral propositions and the realities of international law are firmly grounded in anti-naturalism. The two fundamental principles are: the rule of law is an important element of morality, and a legal norm must be morally neutral in order for a society to be legitimate.
Dworkin’s philosophy of international law is based on three key assumptions. The most fundamental assumption is that moral facts are non-metaphysical and that human beings are not natural. The first is an anti-naturalistic view of moral propositions. The second premise is that normative theorizing is grounded in reality, not just the abstract notion of’moral fact’. A law is rationally valid only if it is grounded in the moral truths of human beings.
In contrast, the moral truth of international law is based on the normative principle, which is based on the moral facts of international law. Consequently, moral facts are non-metaphysical. The third principle is that law and values are not subject to metaphysical laws. This means that moral propositions are non-metaphysical. Thus, no two things are identical. Moreover, Dworkin’s principles have a clear connection with each other and are complementary.
Dworkin’s philosophy of international law is premised on three main assumptions. Firstly, he assumes that moral facts and moral judgments are non-metaphysical. Therefore, moral propositions are not objective. Finally, he advocates a more naturalistic account of law. These three premises are crucial for the understanding of the theory of international law. Essentially, this philosophy is based on the morality of humanity.